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1 Introduction 
The development of the rubber boom (1870-1910) in the Brazilian Amazon is shrouded 
by myths and legends that reflect the high profits accrued in a region that was 
considered by most, a pre-capitalist society. In this context, Manaus Opera House is 
paradigmatic: the building is a monument to rubber bonanza. Inaugurated in December 
1896, it is still preserved in its original style: eclectic and neo-classic architecture built 
with materials and a labor force brought from Europe. In Belém, the main rubber hub, 
another sumptuous theatre had been built from rubber proceeds some years earlier, the 
Theatro da Paz (Theatre of Peace). During the rubber boom, it was said that Manaus 
diamond consumption per capita was the largest in the world, men walked with canes 
topped in gold and silver, children went to school in Paris or Lausanne and almost 2,500 
inhabitants took first-class tickets to Europe every year. Houses were decorated in 
Parisien style where “pre-dinner drinks were usually sipped from silver champagne 
goblets set on Carrara marble-topped tables with bases of solid gold”.2  In addition, it 
was also said that Havana cigars were lit with bank notes of 500 milréis (equivalent to 20 
pounds at the 1900 exchange rate) and that every toothache was treated in Europe.3  
Exaggeration or not, these descriptions of the rubber boom reflect the rapid wealth that 
flowed to the region from 1870 to 1910, capturing the imagination of many people 
around the world and fuelling immigration. 
Despite these accounts of money squandering, the literature on the rubber boom 
has resorted to a Dependendist view of rubber production in the Brazilian Amazon in 
which foreigners appropriated and sent abroad most of the wealth accumulated from 
rubber production. This view is in tune with the Global Commodity Chain approach 
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that argues that manufacturing/core economies absorb the bulk of surplus generated in 
the commodity chain. This paper challenges both approaches and asks for a more 
careful analysis of the business history of commodity chains. The business analysis at 
the micro level may falsify or verify assertions made at the macro level, which had been 
the usual level of analysis of commodity chains so far. By rejecting the Global 
Commodity Chain approach, it is necessary to examine more carefully the historical 
evolution of the commodity chain. This paper is a first step in this direction through a 
business history of the relationship between two nodes of the rubber chain: exporters 
placed in Brazil and importers placed in industrialized countries. 
The paper is organized in 6 sections, including this introduction. Section 2 
provides a discussion on the Global Commodity Chain Approach, highlighting its main 
assumptions and works as well as its limitations. Section 3 presents the rubber chain and 
explains the Dependentist view on the rubber trade in the Brazilian Amazon during the 
rubber boom (1870-1910). Section 4 discusses some of the stylized facts that contradict 
assumptions made by the Dependentist view whereas Section 5 provides an analysis of 
the relationship between two nodes of the rubber chain by using business archives. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2  The Global Commodity Chain Approach 
The Global Commodity Chain (GCC) approach addresses questions about what 
products countries do (and should) import and export in relation to complex 
institutions. Instead of deriving trade patterns from optimizing behavior of rational 
economic agents, for GCC, trade is taken as embedded in, and to a considerable extent 4 
 
as determined by, specific (but changing) institutional structures.4 GCC is ultimately the 
development of the World-System Theory at the micro level. It is thus imperative to 
discuss the main features of this theory before analyzing the Global Commodity Chain 
approach. 
A social-system is a self-contained unit o f  a n a l y s i s  a s  t h e  d y n a m i c s  o f  i t s  
development is mainly internal. Only small autonomous subsistence economies and 
world-systems can be considered as actual social systems. According to Wallerstein, a 
world-system is thus “a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member 
groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence”.5 In history, there have only existed two 
types of world-systems: world-empires, in which there was a single political system over 
the whole area, and world-economies in which such political system did not exist. 
According to Wallerstein, it was exactly the absence of a single political system that 
allowed capitalism to operate within an arena larger than any political entity could 
actually control, giving capitalists room for maneuver that was structurally based. 
Geographical factors such as transport and communication defined the borders of 
this world-system, inside which an extensive division of labor developed. This division 
of labor was geographical and arose not only from ecological factors as it was also a 
function of the social organization of work: following a Marxist framework, it magnified 
and legitimized the ability of some groups within the system to exploit others. As a 
consequence, a clear-cut division between core-states and peripheral areas arose. 
Whereas core-states were those where a strong state machinery and a national culture 
were created to ensure the coherence of the world-system and to justify disparities that 
had arisen within the world-system, peripheral areas were those where the indigenous 
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states were weak, ranging from non-existence (e.g. colonial situation) to one with a low 
degree of autonomy (such as neo-colonial situation). Core-states were thus understood 
as those that possessed sovereignty vis-à-vis other states which additionally were strong 
before any particular social group within the state. There were also semiperipheral areas 
which were in between the core and the periphery: some of those areas had been either a 
core-state of a given world-economy or a peripheral area that was promoted as a result 
of changing geopolitics of an expanding world-economy. It is possible to infer then that 
for Wallerstein, state structures were relatively strong in the core-areas and relatively 
weak in the periphery.6 
The aforementioned division of labor entails a hierarchy of occupational tasks in 
which core-states concentrated higher levels of skill and capital. Since a capitalist world-
economy essentially rewarded accumulated capital (including human capital) at a 
higher rate than raw labor, the system was prone to self-maintenance and to increasing 
disparity. Moreover, the absence of a central political entity made it very difficult to 
employ counteracting measures to remedy this maldistribution of rewards. This 
maldistribution of rewards, in turn, did not necessarily generate the seeds of internal 
discontentment and dissolution since with the expansion of the system (especially 
through technological developments) ever new areas were being absorbed. This process 
of development in the periphery (and in the semiperiphery) then masked the inequality 
of rewards.7 
Wallerstein’s framework is based essentially on the nation-state and consequently 
individual workers, entrepreneurs, industries and firms were either neglected in his 
analysis or assigned a secondary role. As these players influence the functioning of the 
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world-system, it was necessary to integrate them into the Wallersteinian framework. 
That is exactly one of the initial objectives of the global commodity chain (GCC) 
literature: according to its proponents, by tracing the network of commodity chains, it is 
possible to track the underlying division and integration of labor processes and thus 
monitor the constant development and transformation of the world-economy’s 
production system.8 In this context, a commodity chain is understood as a “network of 
labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity”9. For 
analytical purposes, the chain is assumed to be comprised of several nodes or “boxes” 
that correspond to quite specific production processes. The boundaries of a given box 
are taken as socially constructed and locally integrated, highlighting the social 
embeddedness of economic organization. Therefore, a box may be redefined, 
reconstructed, consolidated or subdivided based on technical or social organizational 
changes.  
In short, a “GCC consists of a set of interorganizational networks clustered 
around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one 
another within the world-economy”10. At the macro level, all these networks are 
constituents of the world-system in which an extensive division of labor exists along 
geographic lines. This division of labor is understood as being usually triggered by a 
globalization process of production and trade.11 For analytical purposes, such 
globalization process may be subdivided into three different phases: a) investment-
based globalization (1950-1970) when the multinational spread of transnational 
corporations accelerated in a growing number of manufacturing and raw material 
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industries; b) trade-based globalization (1970-1995) was based on the rapid and 
diversified industrialization of a wide range of developing nations, changing the center 
of gravity for many manufacturing industries; c) digital globalization (1995 to date) 
when an information revolution developed as a consequence of the rapid spread of 
connectivity, impacting on business strategies. 
The result of this ongoing globalization process is the emergence of a worldwide 
manufacturing system in which production capacity is dispersed to an unprecedented 
number of developing as well as industrialized countries. This globalization pattern 
implies a degree of functional integration between and control over internationally 
dispersed activities that span over core, semiperipheral and peripheral areas12. This 
international dispersion of activities, in turn, follows a hierarchy whose rationale is 
given by the world-system theory: a relatively greater share of wealth accrues to core-
like nodes than to peripheral ones, underscoring the fact that, by construction, the 
periphery produces raw materials whereas the core produces industrial products. Even 
though this is too simple and might not be true for all commodity chains, it should be 
true for the world-economy as a whole.  
Therefore, hierarchy among countries at the macro-level (periphery versus core 
areas in the world-system theory) translates into a relation of power among nodes along 
a commodity chain at the micro level (GCC). Power here is defined as the ability to 
coordinate and control transnational production systems, which can be structured and 
categorized in two different ways: as producer-driven or buyer-driven. On the one 
hand, “producer-driven commodity chains are those industries in which transnational 
corporations or other large integrated industrial enterprises play the central role in 
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controlling the production system (including its backward and forward linkages)”13. The 
distinctive feature of the producer-driven commodity chain is the degree of control 
exercised by the headquarters of transnational corporations. On the other hand, “buyer-
driven commodity chains refer to those industries in which large retailers, brand-name 
merchandisers, and trading companies play the pivotal role in setting up decentralized 
production networks in a variety of exporting countries, typically located in the Third 
World”14.  
Ultimately, under the GCC framework, power assures that the most profitable 
nodes will be located in core areas. According to Hopkins and Wallerstein, monopoly 
and competition are key to understand the distribution of wealth among the nodes in a 
commodity chain (and in aggregate, for the world-system as a whole). Competitive 
pressures are less pronounced in core nodes as enterprises and states in core areas gain 
competitive edge through innovations that transfer competitive pressures to peripheral 
areas of the world economy15. 
Even though commodity chain analyses are usually a-historic, competitive 
pressures change over time following a Shumpeterian notion of competition. For 
Hopkins and Wallerstein, concentration and decentralization (or shifts in the zonal 
location of nodes) are associated with cyclical rhythms of the world economy: during A-
periods (upswings) vertical integration and geographical concentration of boxes of a 
chain are induced as a consequence of reduction of transaction costs, whereas during B-
periods (downswings) a geographical dispersal of chain’s boxes happens in order to 
ensure reduction in labor costs by subcontracting.16 
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The underlying idea of the Global Commodity Chain framework is thus that, by 
describing and analyzing a commodity chain, it is possible to show how social relations 
shape production, distribution, and consumption in a given industry or sector. Even 
though theoretically it could be applied to all commodity chains (maybe requiring 
sometimes some adaptations), GCC has mainly been applied to industrial chains such as 
apparel17, semi-conductors18, automobiles19 and footwear20 despite some attempts to 
apply it to other areas such as services21, fresh fruit and vegetables22 and illegal 
commodities23. Therefore, the rubber chain has been so far left out. However, it will be 
argued here that the GCC approach does not provide a suitable framework to analyze 
the rubber chain and thus an alternative theory/model needs to be found. 
The Global Commodity Chain approach is a development of the world-system 
theory at the micro level. As such, it is an extension of the dependency theory. Instead of 
the Prebischian notion of dependency being created from increasingly unequal terms of 
trade24, in the world-system the global market is an uneven playing field, underscored 
by the existing hierarchy between core and periphery areas that translates into a relation 
of power between nodes of the commodity chain located in these two areas. Proponents 
of the GCC approach have seldom appropriately defined the concept of ‘power’. It is 
certainly the equivalent of the hierarchy existent at the macro level but its underlying 
rationale is usually lacking. For Hopkins and Wallerstein, core areas derive power over 
peripheral (and semiperipheral) areas out of the development and possession of more 
advanced technologies and consequently by high degrees of market power whereas, for 
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Gereffi, power involves the ability to out-source lower value-added activities and to 
retain or incorporate those with higher value-added.25 As noted by Raikes et al., under 
the GCC approach, power is usually regarded in an ‘all or nothing’ terms: it usually 
disregards degrees of power along the chain and assumes a polar structure in which one 
node of the chain is taken as dominant.26 
As mentioned above, the GCC approach was usually applied to industrial chains 
and largely ignored their historical/cyclical context. Both the historical and cyclical 
contexts are embedded. On the one hand, the historical context is actually provided by 
the world-system theory that describes how capitalism evolved within the world-
system. On the other hand, cycles are explained by a Schumpeterian notion of 
development. 
There have been some efforts though to construct the global commodity chain 
analysis with a more detailed historical context. Although there are just a few 
contributions in this direction27, its proponents tend to reject the center-periphery 
assumption of GCC. By doing so, they typically reject the world-system theory 
altogether replacing it with more neoclassical economic reasoning and modern standard 
trade theory models. A construction of a more detailed and integrated historical context 
becomes thus a requirement as it ceases to be embedded in and becomes commodity-
specific. In this context, the evolution of the commodity chain over time now interacts 
with this more general and specific historical background. In the commodity chain 
approach, the macro dimension is usually explored but very little has been done to 
incorporate the micro dimension of the chain. In this regard, business archives provide a 
rich source to complement and verify assertions about commodity chain made at the 
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macro level. The objective of this paper is exactly to bring business history to the fore: 
through the analysis between two nodes of the rubber chain, the paper shows that the 
rubber chain does not fit into the GCC framework. The dependentist view of rubber 
production does not seem valid either. 
 
3  The Rubber Chain: Exporters, Exploitation & Dependency 
Until mid-eighteenth century metallic currency was barely used in the Brazilian 
Amazon, and the bulk of transactions was carried out through exchanges of 
merchandises such as cotton. Only in 1749 was fiat money introduced, and a hundred 
years later it was still of scarce utilization due to slavery (which meant that many labor 
arrangements did not involve payment of wages) and geographical conditions (in more 
remote places people still preferred to exchange merchandises than to make transactions 
based on fiat money). Since colonial times, however, an informal credit channel had 
been evolving. The first economic activity of the region, the collection of drogas do 
sertão28, relied heavily upon the exchange of merchandises: the gatherer received 
merchandises in exchange for the product collected in the Amazon Forest. This informal 
credit channel was called aviamento which means credit without money.29 
Therefore, according to the literature, aviamento turned to be the typical credit 
channel in the Amazon Region. During the rubber boom the aviamento was roughly 
organized into a horizontal channel (see Figure 1) in which the estate owner advanced 
the merchandises to the tapper in exchange for a promise to deliver a certain quantity of 
rubber. This merchandise was supposed to be the means of living that would allow him 
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to concentrate solely on rubber extraction. The estate owner, in turn, was financed by an 
aviador, who was merely an intermediary who bought the merchandises from the export 
houses (or from importers with the money advanced by the export houses) which were 
the ultimate source of funding in that credit channel. Supposedly, these export houses 
were controlled from abroad and their surplus drained to core economies, notably the 
USA, Britain, France and Germany. In these economies, the rubber chain was much 
simpler: there were rubber traders (importers of crude rubber) who supplied the 
manufacturing firms, either directly or through an intermediary or agent. 13 
 




Source: Elaborated by me, following a stylised version of the rubber chain.14 
 
The aviamento credit channel encompassed all nodes of the rubber chain located 
within the Brazilian Amazon and was much more complex than what this ‘Weberian’ 
ideal credit chain suggests. It hides several other relationships between the economic 
agents involved in the rubber chain as the degree of verticalization increased over time, 
especially during the last decade of the rubber boom (1900-1910). First, several 
intermediaries possessed their own ships to transport rubber from the jungle to 
warehouses in Belém or Manaus. Secondly, these intermediaries invariably ended up 
possessing some rubber estates, either following a business plan or as a consequence of 
foreclosure of rubber estates for collection of debts from their clients. Thirdly, some 
intermediaries also exported part of their rubber and could then be considered as export 
houses. Conversely, some export houses ventured into the intermediary market and also 
ended up renting or buying rubber estates. 
Contemporary accounts stressed the extreme economic exploitation entailed by 
this credit chain. For instance, in 1854 Sebastião do Rego Barros, president of Pará 
Province, stated that  
 
“(…) this difference [he referred to the trade balance surplus, highlighting 
that imports had doubled whereas exports had quadrupled from 1851-52 
to 1853-54] is the result of higher consumption of imported goods, the extremely 
high price of rubber and, consequently, the employment of almost every men into 
rubber extraction and production which impels us to buy first necessity goods, 
which we had produced once, from other Provinces. This is certainly bad since the 
high profits of rubber industry, which absorbs and annihilates every other 
industry, do not lead to wealth distribution and establishment of small properties 
with their advantages and stability but rather to wealth accumulation in the hands 15 
 
of a few, mainly foreigners. This scenario results in poverty for the mass 
population who abandoned their homes, small stores and maybe families in order 
to devote themselves to an uncertain and harsh life in which profits evaporates 
rapidly.”30 
 
Another president of Pará Province, Francisco Carlos de Araújo Brusque, echoed 
Barros’s view in 1862: 
 
“[Rubber industry] is the most important element of our actual wealth, but this 
should not be mistaken, it is wealth for a few since it pours misfortune and poverty 
into the heart of those employed in its extraction and production. 
(…) 
The men who work [in the rubber industry] are represented as inert quantities, 
or figures at the end of a column that can be summed up, as if the mankind were a 
company where the worker plays the role of a machine where everything can be 
represented as profits or losses, forgetting that those quantities are persons and the 
arithmetic figures are lives; morality of human beings guided by God to the same 
destiny to which we aspire.”31  
 
Rego Barros’ and Araújo Brusque’s complaints were made very early in the 
Rubber boom and they most certainly voiced the fear and opposition against rubber 
production stemming from part of the old Amazonian elite who based their wealth in 
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agriculture, cattle or other traditional activity of the region. The opposition eventually 
faded as most of the old elite were integrated into rubber production or profited 
indirectly from it. However, the organization of crude rubber production in the Brazilian 
Amazon continued to be denounced. The usual complaint was that the [foreign] export 
houses, sitting at the top of the chain, were absorbing most of the profits from rubber 
production. The credit channel was criticized by contemporaries such as Woodroffe. For 
him, the credit chain entailed exploitation at each layer of the rubber chain, 
 
“(…) nearly the whole of the Amazon seringals [rubber estates] are mortgaged to 
commercial houses in Manáos, Pará, and the smaller towns, the proprietor relying 
upon the mortgages for his merchandise and, as a rule, binding them down to 
deliver to him alone. The whole organization reminds me one of the saying that the 
biggest fishes eat the bigger ones, who in their turn, prey on the little ones, whilst 
these, the little fish, eat mud.”32 
 
British Consuls also denounced the aviamento credit chain, as Mr. Cheetham did 
in 1909: 
 
“(…) The whole of this valuable trade is gathered in the first place by a handful of 
illiterate, untrained men who, taking their lives in their hands, enter the vast 
uncultivated wilderness of the upper Amazon and on behalf of distant aviadores 
[intermediaries] and nominal forest owners, tap the trees and smoke the rubber 
                                                  
32 Woodroffe (1916, p. 48). 17 
 
that later figures as the second asset in Brazilian commercial and financial 
prosperity.”33 
 
Contemporary descriptions such as these could be tediously repeated. What is 
important is to understand how these descriptions shaped the way researchers later 
perceived the rubber boom. Some authors indeed followed this exploitative line of 
argument to construct a dependentist view of the rubber boom in the Brazilian 
Amazon.34 Their views can be summarized in the following way. Debt-peonage, 
bondage, semi-serfdom or indenture system was at the heart of rubber production in the 
Brazilian Amazon since it developed as the commonest outcome of migration to the 
Amazon. The underlying idea was that in order to move, the laborer indebt himself and, 
once having arrived at the rubber estate, was exploited. Rubber laborers were generally 
described as comprised of a mass of dehumanised and defenceless men who were 
exploited by cruel and greedy capitalists due to the latter’s monopoly over the means of 
production (rubber fields and tools). In turn, rubber estate owners were also usually 
taken as having power to enforce the so-called ‘Rules of the Rubber Fields’ which 
dictated that fugitive laborers would be returned to their original rubber fields. Since the 
laborer was inside the forest and worked alone, escape was normally a difficult 
enterprise since there were not many alternatives left. If the conditions prevailing in the 
forest were not sufficient to entice laborers to work, rubber estate owners could resort to 
physical punishment, or so the literature argued.  
Violence was at least assumed as a latent threat that shaped labor relations during 
the Brazilian rubber boom. Because land was supposedly free, in a Domarian framework, 
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labor had to be controlled or coerced. This account of the rubber boom was extended to 
the other links of the rubber chain providing the basis of a Dependentist view of rubber 
production in the Brazilian Amazon. The credit channel was organized in a vertical way, 
in which every node was exploiting the node immediately beneath it. In this view, 
rubber production was the outcome of several successive exploitative relations along the 
rubber chain in which most of the surplus was drained by [foreign] export houses. These 
foreign export houses, in turn, were merely agents of foreign buyers who were the 
ultimate winners. Monopoly of capital was the mechanism that provided the rationale 
for such exploitative system. In this setting, at first glance, the rubber chain could neatly 
fit into the GCC framework. 
The Dependentist view and the GCC approach certainly have different rationales, 
but some parallels can be drawn between their predictions. For the GCC approach, the 
manufacturers were the winners as they concentrated capital, technology (vulcanization) 
and skills that sanctioned a lower level of competition and higher profitability. 
Manufacturers should have thus retained the most profitable activities and outsourced 
the least profitable ones. In this context, traders would merely be agents of industrial 
interests as much as suppliers of raw rubber would be tied to traders: surplus was 
thereby sucked up from supply to the manufacturing core. In turn, for the Dependentist 
literature the ultimate winners were the foreign traders but only because their 
proponents were applying a partial analysis t o  t h e  r u b b e r  c h a i n .  I f  w e  a p p l y  t h e i r  
rationale for the nodes located in the manufacturing countries, we certainly ended up 
with the same result from the GCC approach: manufacturers were the most profitable 
agents of the rubber chain. Even though competition was not central to their analysis 
(rather the Domarian and Marxist frameworks were), it helped explain the way foreign 19 
 
traders generated ‘monopoly’ surpluses from the chain that were drained to the 
manufacturing economies. 
 
4  Rubber Trade: Stylized Facts 
The Brazilian Amazon (periphery) was thus a producer of raw material (crude rubber) 
to supply rubber manufacturing companies located at core economies, notably, the USA 
and Britain. In this regard, the GCC and Dependentist literatures would suggest the 
following points: 
 
1.  The nodes located in the manufacturing countries were the most profitable ones; 
2.  There was a situation of dependency and exploitation along the chain in which, 
from the Brazilian Amazon perspective, foreigners were profiting the most;  
3.  Competition should increase and Profitability decrease as we move from rubber 
manufacturing to raw rubber supply. 
 
However, crude rubber production may have been extremely profitable and not as 
competitive as the GCC approach would let us believe. Thus export houses had to be 
foreign-owned, controlled from abroad. This is the rationale for the dependentist view 
of the rubber chain: the blame was invariably on the [foreign] export houses which 
extracted most of the surplus generated in the rubber production. But did nationality of 
capital really matter? How concentrated were Brazilian Amazon’s rubber exports? Were 
the export houses only agents of foreign buyers? Were they really exploiting the rubber 
chain? These questions are all interconnected and to provide answers, it is necessary to 20 
 
look at the export market in Brazil and see its interactions with buyers located abroad. 
That is the objective of this section and of the following one. 
Active foreign participation in the Amazonian trade can probably be dated from 
the 1850s when two foreign export houses appeared in the city of Belém (and would 
both later become among the largest in the region): Denis Crouan & Co., French cocoa 
traders, and Singlehurst, Brocklehurst & Co., a British concern that later would also 
organize the transatlantic Red Cross Line.35 Over time, foreign capital became 
predominant in the export sector. Looking at the ranking of rubber exporters from Pará 
in Figure 2, it is possible to see the foreign presence in the Amazonian rubber trade: 
Cmok, Prusse & Co. (German), Adelbert H. Alden (USA), Frank da Costa & Co. 
(Brazilian), The Sears Pará Rubber Co. (USA), Rudolph Zietz (German), Witt & Co. 
(German), R. Suárez (Bolivian), Mello & Co. (a Brazilian concern that was later 
reorganized and re-capitalized in London), H. A. Astlett (USA), Kanthack & Co. 
(British), Comptoir Colonial Français (French), B.A.Antunes (Portuguese/Brazilian). 
However, as Weinstein (1983) has already claimed, origin of capital is not as important 
as their relationship with foreign buyers. We will come back to this point later in this 
section. 
Figure 2 also shows the market share in the rubber trade during the fiscal year 
1899-1900. From 1870 to 1910, some other export houses fought for a position in the 
trade but throughout most of the rubber boom, a few export houses dominated the 
rubber export trade in both Manaus and Belém, the two rubber hubs. For instance, as 
Figure 2 shows, during the 1899-1900 fiscal year, the top three export houses accounted 
for 72.9% of all rubber exported from Belém and 53.0% from Manaus. Concentration was 
in fact even higher since several Manaus export houses were simply agents or branches 
                                                  
35 Weinstein (1983, p. 62) and Fernandes (2009, Ch. 6). 21 
 
of Belém export houses which moved part of their operations upriver as a consequence 
of taxation incentives: in 1878 the State of Amazonas (where Manaus lays) decided to 
divert part of the trade towards its jurisdiction by levying a lower duty for rubber 
exported directly from Manaus in comparison with rubber channeled through Belém. 
When in 1885 the tax gap widened to 5 percentage points, most export houses and 
intermediaries (aviadores) were forced to move part of their operations to Manaus in 
order to profit from the lower tariff.36 
 
Figure 2 – List of Exporters of Rubber from Pará and Manaus (1899-1900) 
 
Source: Adapted from UK Diplomatic and Consular Reports, n. 2580, Annual Series, Brazil, Report for the Year 1900 on the 
trade of Para and District, p. 23. 
                                                  
36 Weinstein (1983, pp. 195-196). 
From Belém (in kg) USA % Europe % Total %
Cmok, Prusse & Co. 2,081         20.7% 3,367        39.1% 5,448        29.2%
Adelbert H. Alden 3,032         30.1% 1,182        13.7% 4,214        22.6%
Frank da Costa & Co. 2,302         22.9% 1,651        19.2% 3,953        21.2%
The Sears Pará Rubber Co. 1,908         19.0% -            0.0% 1,908        10.2%
Rud. Zeitz 250            2.5% 895           10.4% 1,145        6.1%
Denis Crouan & Co. 107            1.1% 349           4.1% 456           2.4%
R. Suárez & Co. -            0.0% 334           3.9% 334           1.8%
Mello & Co. -            0.0% 227           2.6% 227           1.2%
H. A. Astlett 187            1.9% 16             0.2% 203           1.1%
Henry Airlie & Co. 105            1.0% 71             0.8% 176           0.9%
Kanthack & Co. 32              0.3% 101           1.2% 133           0.7%
Comptoir Colonial Français -            0.0% 132           1.5% 132           0.7%
B.A.Antunes & Co. -            0.0% 101           1.2% 101           0.5%
Sundry Exporters 61              0.6% 184           2.1% 245           1.3%
Total 10,065     100.0% 8,610      100.0% 18,676    100.0%
From Manaus (in kg) USA % Europe % Total %
Prusse, Dusendschon & Co. 773            32.1% 1,090        18.8% 1,863        22.7%
Witt & Co. 825            34.2% 506           8.7% 1,331        16.2%
Marius & Levy 11              0.5% 1,144        19.7% 1,155        14.1%
Rud. Zeitz 89              3.7% 400           6.9% 489           6.0%
Adelbert Alden 356            14.8% 49             0.8% 405           4.9%
Comptoir Colonial Français 4                0.2% 337           5.8% 341           4.2%
J.H.Andresen 22              0.9% 276           4.8% 298           3.6%
Brocklehurst & Co. 112            4.6% 138           2.4% 250           3.0%
Kahn Pollack & Co. -            0.0% 193           3.3% 193           2.4%
Luiz Schill & Co. -            0.0% 144           2.5% 144           1.8%
Mello & Co. 4                0.2% 125           2.2% 129           1.6%
J.A. de Freitas & Co. 26              1.1% 77             1.3% 103           1.3%
Moray and Aguiar -            0.0% 119           2.1% 119           1.4%
Sundry Exporters 187            7.8% 255           4.4% 442           5.4%
Iquitos Merchants -            0.0% 944           16.3% 944           11.5%
Total 2,409       100.0% 5,797      100.0% 8,207       100.0%
Grand Total 12,474     14,407    26,883   22 
 
Looking at the names of the companies in Figure 2 above, it is clear that some 
export houses operated in both cities. That was obviously the case of the German 
exporter, Rudolph Zietz; the French Company, Comptoir Colonial Français; the American 
export house, Adelbert H. Alden; and etc. However, some other branches were more 
difficult to identify as, for instance, Witt & Co. (Manaus) was related to Frank da Costa 
& Co. (Belém) and Prusse Dusendschon & Co. (Manaus) to Cmok, Prusse & Co. (Belém). 
Even though B.A.Antunes & Co. (Portuguese/Brazilian) only appears listed among 
Belém export houses, they also had business in Manaus and Santarém.37 The rubber 
export trade was indeed concentrated in the hands of a few firms, indicating a low 
degree of competition within the rubber trade node of the chain. 
It is very difficult though to analyze how competitive the rubber export trade 
was, as it is hard to follow a given company’s track record over time because export 
houses frequently changed their names. For instance, until 1910, the house of Ernesto 
Schramm became Pusinelli, Prusse & Co., then Cmok, Schrader & Co., and finally 
Schrader Gruner & Co. Therefore, even though the names of the leading export houses 
changed over time and even though several restructuring of these companies occurred38, 
the control of the export trade remained mostly in the same hands during the rubber 
boom. Indeed, looking at the ranking of top exporters of rubber from Manaus in 1910 it 
can be inferred that they were basically the same as in 1899-1900: 1st) Dusendschon, 
Zarges & Co. (the reminiscent of Prusse, Dusendschon & Co.): 6,536,080 kilograms of 
rubber exported; 2nd) Adelbert H. Alden: 2,880,490 kilograms and; 3rd) Scholz & Co. 
(which was the successor of Witt & Co.): 2,715,130 kilograms. In total, these three 
                                                  
37 Almanack e Indicador Commercial do Pará 1905, p. 652. Several other examples of companies operating in 
both cities could be cited, we are limiting the analysis here to the main companies. 
38 Note that the majority of main exporters in 1899-1901 were listed in the Commercial Directory of Latin 
America 1892, pp. 41-44. 23 
 
companies handled 77.2% of the total quant i t y  o f  r u b b e r  e x p o r t e d  f r o m  M a n a u s . 39 
Therefore, Barham and Coomes’ claim that “(…) frequent entry and exit of export 
houses during the rubber boom are consistent with an actively competitive industry”40 
does not find support in the data. It is true that some firms disappeared, as happened to 
the Comptoir Colonial Français41, but at the top the companies were usually only changing 
their names, with the rubber trade remaining basically in the same hands throughout 
most of the period. 
Moreover, Barham and Coomes (1996) further argued that high concentration 
levels were consistent with competition due to contestability: rubber was freely traded 
in major ports in the USA, Europe and the Amazon; there were plenty of information 
available to participants in the market, especially from two trade journals India Rubber 
World (published in New York) and India Rubber Journal (published in London); rubber 
production was very decentralized, being spread over a large territory; etc. In order to 
further support their argument, they cite Weinstein’s (1983) account of the unsuccessful 
attempts by the Vianni trading house to corner Belém rubber exchange over more than a 
decade in the 1870s and 1880s. 
First, information was definitely available in the major cities but it is unlikely that 
it reached the far corners of the Amazon basin where production was actually taking 
                                                  
39 Looking at the ranking of exporters in 1883 (in Pará) gives the same impression. Ernesto Schramm & Co. 
was already the leading exporter. It was possible to find Sears & Co. (3), Denis Crouan & Co. (5), 
Singlehurst, Brocklehurst & Co. (8), and B.A.Antunes & Co. (16), among others. Some companies, like 
J.C.G.Vianna & Co. (2) eventually disappeared. This company however had a meteoric rise and fall, 
following several attempts of Vianna to corner the market, and its position in the ranking may be quite 
misleading. See Weinstein (1983) for details on this company and Relatório da Comissão da Praça do 
Commercio do Pará, Apresentado em Assembléia Geral de 10 de Janeiro de 1884, Annexo n. 72 for the ranking of 
exporters in 1883. 
40 Barham and Coomes (1996, pp. 32-35). 
41 Note that Comptoir Colonial Français was a French concern that was created with the intention of 
verticalize the entire rubber chain through “modern” methods of management. The company was 
nonetheless a fiasco entering in liquidation still during the boom, possibly because the managers 
neglected Amazonian institutions. The company was a successor of J.M.Marques who sold out his entire 
intermediary and exporting business. See Weinstein (1983). 24 
 
place, especially because the main trade journals were published in English and a few 
people spoke English in the Amazon between 1870 and 1910. It is unlikely that even the 
majority of immigrants spoke that languag e ,  a s  m o s t  o f  t h e m  w e r e  P o r t u g u e s e . 42 
Secondly, production was decentralized but the decision upon levels of production may 
not have been as decentralized as claimed by Barham and Coomes (1996): the trade was 
controlled by a handful of firms and their orders and funding ultimately defined the 
quantity of rubber to be produced. Thirdly, Barham and Coomes’ account of the rubber 
trade is not accurate. Trade was not exactly free inasmuch as some of the transactions 
may have been hidden under forward contracts and only part of the trade occurred in 
spot markets. The free market they refer to is the marginal market: a) the Brazilian spot 
market was supplied by the rubber produced in excess of the forward contracts set by 
the export houses; b) in the USA and in Britain, the spot market was fed by the rubber 
ordered in excess of the forward contracts. They might differ quite substantially, as it is 
not clear that Brazilian export houses would only make orders following orders coming 
from abroad: as next section shows, it is not true that Amazonian export houses were 
simply agents of foreign manufacturers. Actually, according to a representative of the 
Sears Commercial Company (one of the main rubber importing firms into the USA), 
manufacturers did not have stakes in export houses placed in Brazil and nor did they in 
importers placed in their home countries.43 It is thus very likely that these rubber traders 
speculated quite a lot.  
                                                  
42 True, information from these articles eventually found their way into the Amazon via local newspapers. 
However, the level of illiteracy was very high and probably only the elite could read them. Even if it is 
believed that information could have spread by ‘word-of-mouth’, it would take long to reach the most 
remote parts of the Amazon forest. 
43  New York Times, June 3rd 1887. However, as times go by, the relationship between the New York 
Commercial Co. (a pool of rubber traders that encompassed George Alden & Co., Chs. Loewenthal & Co., 
Reimers & Meyer & Co. and Earle Bros.) and the US Rubber Co. would become blurred due to the 
presence of Charles Flint behind both firms. See further below in the text for a discussion on that matter. 25 
 
The degree of competition in the rubber trade seems then to have been very 
limited indeed. As shown, a handful of companies managed to possess a high market 
share of the rubber export trade that remained mostly unchanged over time. The nature 
of their business was simply to buy rubber at the lowest prices possible from the 
intermediaries, called aviadores (even though some export houses were also aviadores in 
their own right), and sell at the highest possible prices to importers located mostly in 
Britain and in the United States. Supposedly, these export houses acted as agents for 
rubber buying firms placed in New York and Liverpool, although a few functioned 
independently (such as J. Marques). For instance, Ernesto Schramm represented Heilbut, 
Symons & Co. of Liverpool and Reimers & Meyer of New York and Boston whereas La-
Roque da Costa & Co. (and Frank da Costa & Co.) represented Joseph Banigan (from 
Woonsocket Rubber Co. and later president of the United States Rubber Co.) and the 
Boston Rubber Shoe Co.44 Moreover, Sears & Co. was founded in 1882 as a subsidiary of 
the renowned and ubiquitous W. R. Grace & Co. besides having also initially 
represented Charles R. Flint & Co., the future architect of mergers in the US rubber 
manufacturing industry.45 His plans were to devise a pool of rubber buyers to increase 
their bargain position in the rubber trade. F i n a l l y ,  A d e l b e r t  H .  A l d e n  r e p r e s e n t e d  
George A. Alden & Co., from Boston, USA.46  
If rubber exporters in Brazil are assumed to have simply followed orders coming 
from abroad, origin of capital mattered little and the critical thing is actually the 
nationality of their main buyers and the relationship they possessed with them. 
                                                  
44 India Rubber World, March 1902, p. 177. Although partly Brazilian funded, the behavior of that company 
differed in no significant way from foreign export houses. See Weinstein (1983). 
45 New York Times, Oct. 23rd, 1885. Sears Pará Co. was established in 1882 by R. T. Sears, W. R. Grace, M. P. 
Grace and C. R. Flint to carry out ‘legitimate trade’, as opposed to speculation. The firm made purchases 
of rubber through large advances to rubber receivers, making delivery to rubber manufacturers at market 
prices. 
46 New York Times, Feb. 19th, 1913. 26 
 
However, different export houses had different goals, as some acted as agents for rubber 
manufacturers whereas others were simply brokers. Indeed, according to a Confidential 
Letter of Hulne Cheeltham to Sir Edward Grey (Petrópolis, 14th March 1909), 
 
“The American Export houses are in more direct relations with the manufacturers, 
and act rather as agents, while the German and French houses are in the position 
of brokers, who, by withholding supply and other manipulations, produce artificial 
prices and otherwise disturb the market.” 
 
If it is possible to generalize, nationality did matter then. However, the distinction 
was not so much between Brazilian/Portuguese export houses versus Foreign ones but 
rather between Agent Export Houses and Independent Export Houses. According to 
Cheeltham (1909) and Weinstein (1983), American export houses tended to be agents of 
foreign manufacturers whereas other export houses tended to act more independently 
as brokers. But what was the degree of freedom these export houses actually had? Were 
they merely agents of rubber importing firms placed in New York, Liverpool and 
London for which they received a fee for their services? Were they able to speculate? 
What was the bargain position they had in their interactions with rubber buyers? These 
are very difficult questions to address in a definitive way but, based on new accounting 
data (micro) collected by the author from American, British and Brazilian sources, next 
section tries to shed some light on some of these issues by analyzing a case study: the 
relationship between J.H. Andresen, a Portuguese/Brazilian rubber export house of 
Manaus and Schluter & Co. traders of rubber coffee and tea, placed in London but with 
branches in Liverpool, New York, Hamburg and in several other cities in Europe. If 
some light can be shed on these issues, it will be possible to draw the power relation 27 
 
between rubber traders in rubber consuming countries versus rubber traders in rubber 
producing countries. 
 
5  Case Study: Edmund Schluter & Co. vs. J. H. Andresen & Co. 
Edmund Schluter & Co. were general merchants (particularly in coffee, rubber and tea) 
with trading links in France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Austria, the United 
States and Brazil. The business was founded in 1858 and was initially based at 35 
Mincing Lane (1858-1859). In 1860, they moved to 24 Mark Lane where they remained 
throughout the rubber boom.47 The company collection is comprised of ledgers, account 
sales, bills receivable, cash books, coffee purchase book, expenditure daybook, invoice 
book, and journals. However, only the ledgers and the cash books overlap with the 
rubber boom (1870-1910). The ledgers are divided into three handwritten notebooks: 
1873-1886, 1887-1900, and 1901-1910.48 They show more detailed information on the 
company’s Balance Sheets than what was ultimately published and submitted to the 
London Stock Exchange. Whereas the published Balance Sheets only showed 
consolidated accounts, the handwritten ledgers provide all information related to that 
account at the end of the year. The cash book only refer to the period 1904-1910 but 
provides even more detailed information. In every account, it is possible to see all 
operations credited/debited, even if it is the same operation repeated several times 
during the year. It further shows the date when these operations took place. Therefore, 
                                                  
47 Records of the company were donated to the Guildhall Library in 2005, catalogued and given free access 
to the public at the Manuscript Section. The surviving records used here refer to Ledgers/Balance Sheets 
(1873-1910) and Cash Books (1904-1910). 
48 They show information on Office Furniture, Reserve Account, Share Account, Sundry Charges Account, 
Insurance Account, Commission Account, Debtors, Cash Account, Interest Account, Exchange Account, 
Bills Payable, Merchandise Account, Rubber Account, Tea Account, Coffee Account, Account Sales, Loan 
Account, Creditors, Bills Receivable, Trade Expenses, Dockcharges Account, Freight Account, Postage and 
Telegrams, Billbrockerage, Coupons Account, Shipping Charges, Fire Insurance and Sundry Creditors. 28 
 
whilst the ledgers provide a snapshot of the financial situation of the company at the 
end of the year, the cash books provide information for all operations that happened 
within that same year. 49  
From the company’s balance sheets, it is not possible to know where funding 
came from, but they provided some clues. Dividends were rarely paid (or at least they 
were not explicitly stated in the balance sheets) and when they did, they usually referred 
to someone from the Schluter’s family or some other German investor50. The company 
seldom borrowed money and when it did, very small amounts were involved. It is 
possible that members of the Schluter family might have individually borrowed money 
and invested it in the company but, unfortunately, if these transactions ever existed, it 
was not possible to trace them. Small loans were sometimes given to individuals and 
companies but they were never significant either.  
A significant amount of money was invested in stock shares of several 
companies. The composition of the company’s portfolio changed substantially over time. 
In the 1870s, investments in shares were very limited and indicated a tendency to invest 
in Central Europe, notably in Hungary. In the 1880s, investment in English concerns 
started to abound in parallel with a shift of investments towards Asia and the River 
Plate.51 Argentina would indeed become the biggest recipient of investments from the 
Company, especially after 1885 when Schluter & Co. started to buy Argentine 
government bonds. Figure 3 above shows a sample page of Schluter & Co.’s ledger in 
1888. On the left hand side, it is possible to see some of the Argentine shares and bonds 
the company invested in: ‘River Plate and General Investment’, ‘Argentine Drawn 
                                                  
49 Edmund Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1873-1910) and Cash Book (1904-1910), Manuscript 
Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 35975-91. 
50 The surnames suggest that they were usually of German origin. 
51 Edmund Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1873-1886), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, 
catalogue reference: MS 35975. 29 
 
Bonds & Coupons’ and ‘Argentine Ced. Nacional B’. Indeed, from 1888, investments in 
Argentina became more diversified with the company holding shares in a railway, a 
water supply & drainage company and an investment trust. Investments elsewhere also 
became more diversified with an important stake on 2 copper companies besides 
investments in aluminum production, an ammunition company and banks.52 
In the 1890s, investments in Argentina continued to dominate in a context in 
which the portfolio of the Company substantially increased, comprising investments in 
several different sectors: tobacco, cotton, petroleum, railway, trading, sugar refining, 
sugar, banks, waterworks, etc. The portfolio further showed a broader geographical 
coverage: Portugal, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba, North America, Borneo, England, 
Germany, etc. After the turn of the century, the portfolio diminished in size and in 
composition with an increasing participation of government loans: besides Argentine 
bonds, Japanese and Brazilian bonds also appeared in the portfolio.53 From the records 
of the company, it is difficult though to assess the profitability of these investments but 
it is possible to speculate that the reduction of the company’s investments in the 1900s 
were a consequence of losses incurred in the 1890s when several holdings were written 




                                                  
52 Edmund Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1888), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, 
catalogue reference: MS 35976. 
53 Edmund Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers, Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 
35976. 30 
 
Figure 3 – Sample Page of Schluter & Co.’s Ledger, 31st December 1888 
 
Source: Edmund Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1888), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 35976. 31 
 
From 1870s to 1910, in contrast to its investments, the company became more and 
more concentrated in the market of a very few products: coffee, rubber, tea and to a 
much lesser extent cocoa. Even though coffee was the main product traded by the 
company, this product will not be analyzed here as the interest rests solely on the 
rubber trade (more specifically on the Brazilian rubber trade). Schluter & Co. 
distributed rubber to the European Continent and to the USA (sometimes rubber was 
also shipped directly to the final destination) and several rubber manufacturers figured 
among the clients of the company: Dunlop Rubber Co., Northern Rubber Co., Rubber 
Co. of Scotland, Russian-American India-Rubber Co., Spencer & Co., Clyde Rubber Co., 
Praeger Gummi W. Fabr., Unity Rubber Co. Ltd., among others.54 It is then possible to 
infer that Schluter & Co. was an independent rubber trader, as no significant long-term 
relationship could be traced between Schluter and any of the above listed rubber 
manufacturers. 
Among the Brazilian suppliers of rubber to Schluter and Co. some were 
identified: Marius & Levy, Schölz & Co, J. H. Andresen, S. Brocklehurst & Co., Mesquita 
& Co., Pará/Marajó Rubber Estates Co. and Araujo Rozas & Co. As mentioned 
elsewhere before, S. Brocklehurst & Co. organised one of the main shipping lines (Red 
Cross Line) connecting Liverpool to the Brazilian Amazon besides being an exporter in 
its own right. Therefore, due to its two different operations, from the records of the 
c o m p a n y  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e p a r a t e  w h at was purely rubber trade and what was 
                                                  
54 Edmund Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers, Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 
35975-7. 32 
 
shipping55. Since Marius and Levy changed their name (they were ultimately bought 
out by B. Levy & Co.) and their operations virtually vanished after the turn of the 
century and most of the other companies sold rubber to Schluter & Co. only 
sporadically, I decided to limit the analysis to the relationship between J. H. Andresen 
& Co. and Schluter & Co. 
J. H. Andresen & Co. (or S/A Armazéns Andresen) was a Portuguese/Brazilian 
trade house placed in Manaus that handled several Amazonian commodities amongst 
which, of course, crude rubber. According to Figure 2 further above, Andresen ranked 
in 7th among the top exporters of rubber from Manaus, a position established by its 
prominent role as a rubber intermediary, especially along the river Solimões.56 
Andresen operations were usually channeled via Oporto that was connected to Manaus 
through its own transatlantic vessels.57 Since there is no evidence that Schluter & Co. 
ever transacted any other commodity with J.H.Andresen & Co., it is likely that most the 
of the transactions between this company and Andresen referred to rubber despite the 
fact that Andresen was a big player in the market of Brazil nuts. Conversely, Schluter & 
Co. was only buying a portion of Andresen’s trade and thus the relationship was not a 
monopsony. Therefore, Andresen seems to have been an independent trader as well. 
 
                                                  
55 It is true that Schluter & Co. specified a separate account for shipping charges but it is not at all clear if 
the outstanding bills and debts of the S. Brocklehurst & Co. would refer to the rubber trade or to shipping 
charges. Anyway, only a few transactions with S. Brocklehurst & Co. were identified which would not be 
enough to make a full picture of the rubber trade as intended here. 
56 Plane (1903, p. 45). 
57 LeCointe (1922, p. 249). 33 
 
Figure 4: Trade Relationship Between Schluter & Co. and J.H.Andresen & Co.
 
Source: (A) = Schluter & Co. Cash Book (1904-1910), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 
35976-8; (B) = I divided total value of transactions between Schluter and Andresen by the average price of rubber 
from British Trade Statistics found in Fernandes (2009); (C) = for 1907, data came from The State of Amazonas and its 
Rubber Forests: with the compliments of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of Amazonas at Manaos (1908), p. 13. For 1909 
and 1910, data was compiled from Loureiro (1989), pp.210-219. 
 
Looking at the financial and commercial transactions between Schluter & Co. 
and J.H. Andresen & Co., it is possible to identify three major periods. First, during the 
1890s, there are no surviving cash books of Schluter & Co. and thus the analysis was 
carried out only from ledgers (balance sheets). The problem with balance sheets is that, 
as emphasized earlier, they only show a snapshot of financial and commercial 
transactions of Schluter & Co. at the end of the year and, by consequence, all 
transactions that were initiated and completed within the calendar year may not have 
been registered in any way there (only their results were). Before the 1890s, 
J.H.Andresen & Co. was rarely recorded, making any inferences about this period very 
uncertain. In the 1890s, J.H.Andresen & Co. name consistently appeared in the balance 
sheets in form of Schluter’s creditor or debtor or whenever there were any outstanding 










% of Andresen 
Exports on Total 
Purchases from 
Schluter
% of Schluter 
Purchases on 
Total Exports from 
Andresen
(A) (B) (C) (B)/(A) (C)/(B)
1907 427,350 226,844 437,948 53.1% 51.8%
1909 2,122,416 354,940 484,096 16.7% 73.3%
1910 3,040,274 123,545 438,825 4.1% 28.2%34 
 
bills to be paid by Schluter.58 In this period, Andresen was usually a net creditor of the 
company as it can be seen in the Figure 4 below. 
Secondly, in the first five years of the twentieth century (1900-1904), Andresen’s 
net position turned into a huge debt with Schluter & Co. that was nonetheless offset by 
outstanding bills. Therefore, the data does not suggest in any way that J.H.Andresen & 
Co. ever became heavily indebted with Schluter & Co. Therefore, Andresen’s net debtor 
position in these years only reflected the nature of the trade: rubber was sent, say, from 
Manaus to Liverpool and invoiced against Schluter & Co. in form of short term payable 
bills. If no other transactions were made, Andresen’s debtor position would be cleared 
out after just a few months.59 We can thus conclude that there was no relation of 
financial dependence between these two firms. 
In 1905 there is evidence of the only interest payment earned from J.H.Andresen 
amounting to £26 11s. Since there was no outstanding loan to Andresen in the Balance 
Sheet in 1905, I believe that the interest payment referred to a short term loan that was 
p r o b a b l y  p a i d  b a c k  d u r i n g  t h e  s a m e  f i s c al year. However, from that year onward, 
Schluter & Co.’s cash books suggest a change in the nature of the trade with Andresen: 
Andresen’s net debtor position was henceforth always close to zero, payable bills 
vanished from the balance sheets and the financial transactions between these two firms 
decreased drastically, especially after 1906 (with the exception of the year 1909).60  
                                                  
58  Schluter & Co. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1887-1900), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue 
reference: MS 35976. 
59  Schluter & Co. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1900-1904), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue 
reference: MS 35977. 
60 Schluter & Co. Cash Book (1904-1910), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 35978. 35 
 
Figure 5 – J.H. Andresen’s net debtor position against Schluter & Co., 1891-1910 
(in current £) 
 
Source: Schluter & Co. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1891-1910) and Cash Book (1904-1910), Manuscript Section at 
Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 35976-8. Note: positive figures refer to net debt of J.H.Andresen & Co. 
with Schluter & Co., whereas negative figures indicate that Schluter was in net debt with J.H.Andresen. 
 
Why did Schluter & Co. substantially changed the nature of the trade with 
Andresen after 1906? Did any other Amazonian firm take over Andresen’s position? 
Schluter & Co.’s rubber account indicate that the Company continued to expand its 
rubber trade so that some other firm took indeed Andresen’s position as the main 
supplier of rubber to Schluter. According to Figure 4, in 1907, Andresen accounted for 
approximately 53% of all rubber imported by Schluter whereas in 1909, its share had 
decreased to 17% and in 1910 to only 4%. However, no other Amazonian firm replaced 
Andresen as the trade was in fact shifted elsewhere, especially to Asia where rubber 
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made an early shift towards Asia61, consistently diminishing the relative volume traded 
with J.H.Andresen & Co. In turn, the latter firm did not diminish its overseas trade, 
finding other buyers for its exports. Indeed, in 1910, Schluter & Co. bought only 28% of 
all rubber exported by J.H.Andresen & Co. 
This change in strategy can also be inferred from Schluter’s investment portfolio. 
Despite the importance of the rubber trade for the company, until 1907 there was no 
direct investment in any rubber producing venture. As can be seen from Figure 6 below, 
from that year onwards, the company started to invest in several plantation companies 
usually located in South East Asia despite the large sum invested in guayule production 
in 1910.62 Guayule Rubber Co. Ltd. was a company operating in Mexico from wild 
guayule rubber sources whose total authorized capital amounted to £400,000 (which 
was fully paid-up).63 Therefore, despite the huge investment in this company, Schluter 
& Co. had just over 1% of the venture. Additionally, there is no evidence that the 
company ever invested in any of its partners in the Brazilian rubber trade even though 
it is possible that a certain member of the Schluter family might have personally 
invested in, say, Andresen.  
 
  
                                                  
61 If this was a conscious decision it is impossible to know. It might very well be the case that 
J.H.Andresen & Co. decided to change its trade partner in Europe and not the opposite. 
62 Schluter & Co. Ledger/Balance Sheets (1901-1910), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: 
MS 35977. 
63 Rubber Producing Companies, Capitalized in Sterling, March 1911. 37 
 
Figure 6 – Rubber Shares in Schluter & Co.’s Portfolio, 1873-1910 
(in current £) 
 
Source: Schluter & Co. Ledger/Balance Sheets (1907-1910), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue 
reference: MS 35977. 
 
What does the analysis of Schluter & Co. accounts tell us? First, the relationship 
between Schluter and Andresen resembles a usual trade relationship in which both 
companies benefited. The accounts indeed suggest that no firm possessed any specific 
market power over another: J.H.Andresen had other clients and Schluter & Co. had 
other suppliers. Market shares changed sharply (see Figure 4) indicating that their 
relationship was not given by static long-term contracts that stipulated fixed amounts 
or shares to be transacted between these two companies. It is true that before 1906, 
J.H.Andresen was a major supplier of rubber to Schluter & Co., but this relationship 
changed over time following different market conditions. The advent of plantations 
(and maybe the 1906 crisis following the unsuccessful valorization attempt by the 
Vianna trading house) caused Schluter’s rubber trade to divert elsewhere but 
J.H.Andresen still found buyers for its exports. Secondly, the trade between Schluter 
Year N. of Shares Name of the Company £ s. d.
1907 100 Bantong Selangor Rubber Estates 50 -       -      
1908 100 Bantong Selangor Rubber Estates 87 10 -      
250 Ledbury Rubber Estates 93 15 -      
1909 1,000 Anglo Malay Rubber Co. Ltd 800 -       -      
500 Chersoncor Estates Ltd. 125 -       -      
1,645 Batong Malaka Rubber Estates Ltd. 2 3 2
1910 1,000 Guayule Rubber Co. Ltd. 1,000 -       -      
3,000 Guayule Rubber Co. Ltd. (ordinary shares) 1,735 -       -      
3,080 Guayule Rubber Co. Ltd. (ordinary shares) 2,000 -       -      
200 Rubber Plantation Investment Trust 333 14 -      
200 Anglo Malay Rubber Co. Ltd 226 9 -      
500 Highlands Lowlands Para Rubber Co. 1,326 2 -      38 
 
and Andresen was not based on commissions: Schluter seemed to have bought the 
rubber from Andresen and sold it either directly to rubber manufacturers or to its own 
agents placed in several cities in Europe and in the USA. Thirdly, even though the 
relationship between Schluter and Andresen seemed to have followed market 
conditions, we should expect that the former firm might have enjoyed a privileged 
position due to its knowledge of supply of and demand for rubber [at least until 1906]. 
However, looking at its own accounts, Schluter & Co. generated very small margins in 
the rubber trade64, which would indicate that if any of these two firms was benefiting at 
the expense of the other, that firm would be Andresen and not Schluter. Without 
Andresen’s accounts it is impossible though to make any definitive conclusion about 
which link of the rubber chain profited the most in the rubber trade and to define, 
incontestably, the relations of power between rubber traders placed in rubber 
consuming and rubber producing countries. After 1906, with further diversification of 
Schluter & Co. towards plantation rubber, it is likely that the bargain position changed 
in Schluter’s favor. Indeed, from 1907 onwards, Schluter’s profits with rubber increased 
sharply: the company accrued £168 in 1907 and £2,235 in 1910. However, J.H.Andresen 
& Co. was still faring well in rubber markets due to the continuing scarcity of this raw 
material that prevailed until 1910. 
                                                  
64 From the records of the company, however, it is difficult to know exactly how the profit and loss on the 
rubber trade was calculated. The results suggest the perception of the company towards the rubber trade 
though. 39 
 
Accounts of De Mello & Co.65, a similar aviador-cum-exporter66, suggest that this 
firm was profiting quite a lot from the rubber trade. The balance sheet at June 30th 1907 
shows that the firm earned £60,138 in profits (after dividends). According to the report 
of directors, the company received 521 tons of rubber that were sold for £251,561 2s. 
10d., or on average by 9s. 8d. per kg. The average price of rubber imported from Brazil 
into the UK (which includes freight rate and docking expenses) was 8s. 11d. (1906-1907) 
much lower than the price earned by De Mello & Co. That can either simply indicate 
that this company was selling higher quality rubber or that it possessed some market 
power, especially because the company was not exporting all its production as part of 
its rubber was sold to other exporters in Manaus: therefore, the average price earned by 
the company was higher than the average price paid by buyers in the UK even though 
the company was selling a significant part of its production in the domestic market. For 
the sake of comparison, in 1907, Schluter & Co. handled 427 tons of rubber and earned 
£169 in profits compared to staggering £60,138 in profits earned by De Mello in that 
same year (out of sales amounting to 521 tons of rubber).67 So, I do not think we should 
expect anything too dissimilar for J.H.Andresen. We may safely infer that this company 
was also very good positioned in the rubber market, being able to exploit its market 
power to a considerable extent. 
                                                  
65 Guildhall Library, Tea, Coffee & Rubber – 1906-1907, commercial report, catalogue number 978. 
66 In 1907-8, Andresen ranked 4th in the list of rubber intermediaries at Manaus, with a total of 820 tons of 
rubber handled. We can thus say that Andresen was much bigger than De Mello and, all else equal, we 
could thus expect higher profits for Andresen than those reported for De Mello. See The State of Amazonas 
and its Rubber Forests: with the compliments of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of Amazonas at Manaos, 
1908. 
67 Obviously, the total 40 
 
Generalizations from this case study are still hard to draw as it is difficult to 
know how typical this relationship was. There is no other case study to compare and 
the results here should be regarded then as a first step towards a full understanding of 
the nature and conditions of the transatlantic rubber trade. Yet, until 1910, J.H.Andresen 
might have enjoyed a quite substantial room for maneuver in the rubber market, 
contradicting, at first glance, the fact that export houses in Brazil were generally solely 
operating on behalf of buyers placed in Europe and in the USA.  
It is still necessary to unveil more data from Agent export houses and analyze 
their relationship with foreign buyers to see if their commercial relationship was really 
so dissimilar from the one depicted here. However, as most of these agent export 
houses represented a foreign trader rather than a manufacturer, it is possible that the 
only difference referred merely to the place where the speculation occurred. The 
commercial activities discussed here would be replicated in the consumer’s markets 
(mostly in New York, Liverpool, London, Havre or Hamburg) between the foreign 
rubber trader and the manufacturer. In this regard, it is instructive to see the 
relationship between the New York Commercial Co. and the US Rubber Co. The former 
firm was a pool of US rubber traders organized by Charles Flint in order to control the 
rubber market and force prices down. The US Rubber Co., in turn, was a result of 
several mergers of rubber manufacturing companies (also architected by Flint) that 
aimed at increasing bargaining power in the rubber markets. Looking at the purchases 
of rubber for the year of 1893, we can see that the New York Commercial Co. was 
buying rubber on account of the US Rubber Co. in exchange for a commission. Despite 41 
 
the different commercial arrangement compared to our case study, the relationship 
between these two companies was not fundamentally different from the one between 
Schluter and Andresen. Here, instead of bargaining over prices, the US Rubber Co. and 
the NY Commercial Co. were bargaining over commission rates.68 Anyway, the NY 
Commercial Co. did not seem to have strictly followed policies set by US Rubber Co. as 
attested by the several attempts of this firm to artificially increase rubber prices in the 
market which would logically be against US Rubber Co.’s interests.69 Until around the 
turn of the century, the NY Commercial Co. (through any of its component traders) had 
no direct branch in Brazil, using instead local exporters (some of them Brazilian) to 
supply its needs. For instance, the German export house of Pusinelli, Prusse & Co. 
(antecessors of Cmok, Prusse & Co.) was the main agent of Reimers & Meyer & Co. 
(which was part of the NY Commercial Co.). However, the German export house was 
not strictly tied only with Reimers & Meyer & Co. as this firm also worked as agent for 
Heilbut, Symons & Co. of Liverpool. Therefore, the exporter placed in Brazil still had 
lots of room for maneuver. 
In sum, according to the GCC approach we should expect that core economies 
would retain the most profitable nodes of the chain. However, our sketchy data 
                                                  
68 See for instance the Letter from John C. Marin (Assistant Auditor of the US Rubber Co.) to Henry L. 
Hotchkiss (Chairman of the Committee Accounts & Audit, US Rubber Co.) dated January 24th, 1896. See 
US Rubber Company Collection, Baker Library, Harvard Business School. 
69 See New York Times: March 10th 1886 (Rubber Traders Combining), June 3rd 1887 (The Great Rubber Deal: 
Trying to Harmonize the Conflicting Interests), June 5th 1887 (Rubber Trade Schemes), June 17th 1887 (Trying to 
Corner Rubber), November 6th 1887 (How Rubber Stretches: the Boom in the Market and its Consequences), 
November 6th 1887 (A Short Lived Boom: Prices for Crude Rubber Falling Again – What Mr. Sears Says), 
December 14th 1889 (The Brazilian Monopoly: Foreign Merchants Vigorously Protesting Against Concession), 
January 15th 1888 (A Bigger Rubber Trust: An Association Avowedly to Make Prices and Quality Better), 
September 29th 1889 (A Rubber Trust Assured). 42 
 
suggests that export houses placed in Brazil were profiting substantially, much more 
than foreign buyers. These export houses had room for maneuver to speculate in the 
market leaving foreign buyers and manufacturers at their mercy. Their market power 
originated from their local connections with intermediaries (some of them were actually 
intermediaries themselves) and/or through simple advancement of credit. There is no 
evidence that rubber exporters placed in Brazil were not exploiting their market power 
or that they were facing strong monopsony power. Moreover, the results here seem to 
contradict the dependentist theory too, insofar as many of these export houses (and, 
especially intermediaries) were partly or wholly Brazilian owned. The essence of our 
story here is that the behavior of export houses placed in Brazil was not defined by their 
nationality but rather by their bargain position which depended on market conditions 
and on the actions of other players.  
 
6 Final  Remarks 
The Global Commodity Chain (GCC) approach addresses questions about what 
products countries do (and should) import and export in relation to complex 
institutions. Instead of deriving trade patterns from optimizing behavior of rational 
economic agents, for GCC, trade is taken as embedded in, and to a considerable extent 
as determined by specific (but changing) institutional structures.  The Global 
Commodity Chain approach is a development of the world-system theory at the micro 
level and, as such, it is an extension of the dependency theory. Instead of the 43 
 
Prebischian notion of dependency being created from increasingly unequal terms of 
trade, in the world-system theory, the global market is an uneven playing field, 
underscored by the existing hierarchy between core and periphery areas that translates 
into a relation of power between nodes of the commodity chain located in these two 
areas.  
The proponents of the commodity chain approach, however, reject the center-
periphery assumption of GCC. By doing so, they typically reject the world-system 
theory altogether replacing it with more neoclassical economic reasoning and modern 
standard trade theory models. A construction of a more detailed and integrated 
historical context becomes thus a requirement as it ceases to be embedded in and 
becomes commodity-specific. In this context, the evolution of the commodity chain over 
time now interacts with this more general and specific historical background. In the 
commodity chain approach, the macro dimension is usually explored but very little has 
been done to incorporate the micro dimension of the chain. Business archives provide a 
rich source to complement and verify assertions about commodity chain made at the 
macro level. But, what can we learn from the business history of the rubber chain? 
First, like in Frank and Musacchio (2006), the paper shows that GCC does not 
provide a useful framework to the analysis of certain commodity chains, in particular, 
the rubber chain.70 Secondly, despite Barham and Coomes’ (1996) claims and now, to 
some extent, contrary to Frank and Musacchio (2006), the export market was not at all 
                                                  
70 Frank and Musacchio (2006). 44 
 
free and there was substantial room for collusion among a few firms.71 Since most of 
these firms were foreign-owned, at first glance, the dependentist view seems to have 
been right: foreign-owned export houses were extracting most of the surplus from the 
Brazilian rubber chain. However, there are problems with this interpretation. First, 
there is no evidence that export houses colluded. Secondly, foreign export houses were 
sometimes capitalized by Brazilian/Portuguese capital as well. The distinction of 
nationality of capital was not so black and white and what really mattered was the 
relationship between export houses placed in Brazil and their foreign buyer(s). If all 
export houses were solely agents of a single (or a very few) foreign buyer, most of the 
surplus was probably drained to agents placed abroad. If these firms were able to 
speculate, it is expected that their profits were much higher and appropriated [at least 
partly] internally. As argued here, export houses were not mere agents of foreign 
rubber buyers. Moreover, they probably profited the most in the rubber chain, much 
more than their foreign buyers anyway. 
Indeed, the analysis of the relationship between one Brazilian/Portuguese 
rubber exporter and one British rubber buyer indicates that the relationship between 
them resembled a usual trade relationship in which both companies benefited. 
However, if any company exercised market power, it was probably the 
Brazilian/Portuguese export house. Generalizations from this case study are hard to 
draw as it is difficult to know how typical this relationship was but the 
Brazilian/Portuguese export house might have enjoyed some market power at the 
                                                  
71 Barham and Coomes (1996) and Frank and Musacchio (2006). 45 
 
British buyer’s expense, contradicting, at first glance, the fact that export houses in 
Brazil were generally solely operating on behalf of buyers placed in Europe and in the 
USA. There is no evidence that rubber exporters placed in Brazil were prevented from 
exploiting their market power or that they were facing monopsony power. Rubber 
manufacturers were to some extent in the hands of rubber traders, be they Brazilian, 
Portuguese, Germans, French or English. This result certainly brings the rubber chain 
away from the ideal Wallersteinian chain type. More business history of the rubber 
chain (and of other commodity chains) is needed to verify or falsify some of the 
assumptions made at the macro level of analysis. As shown here, the micro analysis 
shows additional information that helps understand the rubber chain. 
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